کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
968733 | 1479472 | 2011 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents Thanks for nothing? Not-for-profits and motivated agents](/preview/png/968733.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We re-examine the labor donation theory of not-for-profits and show that these organizations may exist not necessarily because motivated workers prefer to work in them, or that they dominate for-profits in terms of welfare, but because the excess supply of motivated workers makes the non-profit form more attractive to managers. We show that if firms had to compete for motivated workers then not-for-profit firms would be competed out by for-profit firms. Therefore, in the choice between not-for-profit and for-profit provision, other than incentive problems, the distribution of rents between management and workers, and consequently, the relative scarcity of motivated workers may play an important role.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 95, Issues 1–2, February 2011, Pages 94–105
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 95, Issues 1–2, February 2011, Pages 94–105
نویسندگان
Maitreesh Ghatak, Hannes Mueller,