کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
969010 | 1479431 | 2015 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
• Local conflict structures are modeled as bilateral hostile interactions on a network.
• Conflict intensity depends on the conflict structure.
• We identify a class of networks where peaceful conflict resolution is always beneficial.
• Outside the identified class peaceful conflict resolution may have adverse effects.
Conflict parties are frequently involved in more than one conflict simultaneously. In this paper the structure of local conflicts is modeled as a conflict network where rivals invest in conflict specific technology to attack their respective neighbors. We prove that there exists a unique equilibrium and examine the relation between total conflict investment (a proxy for conflict intensity) and underlying network characteristics. We also identify a class of conflict networks where peaceful conflict resolution is beneficial in the sense that conflict intensity is reduced. Outside of this class peaceful conflict resolution may be detrimental because countervailing local network effects can actually result in higher conflict intensity.
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 126, June 2015, Pages 104–113