کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
969024 1479467 2011 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Regional initiatives and the cost of delaying binding climate change agreements
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Regional initiatives and the cost of delaying binding climate change agreements
چکیده انگلیسی

The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to a future negotiation. This paper analyzes the strategic implications of delayed negotiations. While, as is well-understood, the incentive to free ride leads to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement, the cost of delay is magnified by players' attempt to secure a favorable bargaining position in the future negotiation. A “brinkmanship”, an “effort substitution”, and a “raising rival's cost” effects all concur to generate high post-agreement emissions. The paper applies this general insight to the issuance of forward or bankable permits.


► The Kyoto and Copenhagen Protocols on climate change mitigation postponed the specification of binding commitments to future negotiations. The incentive to free ride will lead to excessive emissions prior to a binding agreement.
► This cost of delay is magnified by countries' incentive to secure concessions in the future negotiation.
► A “brinkmanship”, an “effort substitution”, and a “raising rival's cost” effects all concur to generate high post-agreement emissions.
► These general insights apply to the issuance of forward or bankable permits.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 95, Issues 11–12, December 2011, Pages 1339–1348
نویسندگان
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