کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
969491 1479486 2008 10 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Social preferences and public economics: Mechanism design when social preferences depend on incentives
چکیده انگلیسی

Social preferences such as altruism, reciprocity, intrinsic motivation and a desire to uphold ethical norms are essential to good government, often facilitating socially desirable allocations that would be unattainable by incentives that appeal solely to self-interest. But experimental and other evidence indicates that conventional economic incentives and social preferences may be either complements or substitutes, explicit incentives crowding in or crowding out social preferences. We investigate the design of optimal incentives to contribute to a public good under these effects would make either more or less use of explicit incentives, by comparison to a naive planner who assumes they are absent.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 92, Issues 8–9, August 2008, Pages 1811–1820
نویسندگان
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