کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
969620 | 1479509 | 2003 | 26 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry Managerial rewards and the behavior of for-profit, governmental, and nonprofit organizations: evidence from the hospital industry](/preview/png/969620.png)
Studies of mixed industries frequently focus on differential behavior between for-profit and either nonprofit or governmental producers. Substantially less is known about differences among governmental, religious nonprofit, and secular nonprofit organizations. We examine the compensation of hospital CEOs to assess the extent to which these three organizational forms pursue similar objectives. Compensation levels, the use of salaries versus bonuses as proxies for weak versus strong incentives, and the criteria organizations use to determine bonuses are analyzed. We conclude that the CEO incentive contracts at religious nonprofit, secular nonprofit, and governmental hospitals imply substantive differences in the behavior of these organizations.
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 87, Issues 9–10, September 2003, Pages 1895–1920