کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
969869 | 1479483 | 2009 | 10 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Policymakers' horizon and the sustainability of international cooperation
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
This paper examines the impact of policymakers' horizon on the sustainability of international cooperation. We describe a prisoners' dilemma game between two infinitely-lived countries run by policymakers. We show that re-election incentives can act as a discipline device, making it easier to sustain cooperation between policymakers with finite but potentially renewable mandates than between infinitely-lived policymakers. We also show that, when voting suffers from a recency bias, policymakers may have incentives to “collude” to get re-elected and term limits may help international cooperation.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 93, Issues 3–4, April 2009, Pages 549–558
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 93, Issues 3–4, April 2009, Pages 549–558
نویسندگان
Paola Conconi, Nicolas Sahuguet,