کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
969947 | 1479488 | 2008 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Interest groups and the electoral control of politicians
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
We develop a model of interest group influence in the presence of repeated electoral competition. In each period of the game, an interest group attempts to “buy” an incumbent's policy choice, and a voter chooses whether to replace the incumbent with an unknown challenger. The voter faces a tension between retaining good politician types and rewarding past performance. The model predicts that “above average” incumbents face little discipline, but others are disciplined increasingly – and re-elected at a higher rate – as the interest group becomes more extreme. Extensions of the model consider term limits, long-lived groups, and multiple groups.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 92, Issues 3–4, April 2008, Pages 482–500
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 92, Issues 3–4, April 2008, Pages 482–500
نویسندگان
James M. Snyder Jr., Michael M. Ting,