کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
970022 | 1479470 | 2011 | 12 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

We present evidence from a natural field experiment designed to shed light on the efficacy of fundraising schemes in which donations are matched by a lead donor. In conjunction with the Bavarian State Opera House, we mailed 14,000 regular opera attendees a letter describing a charitable fundraising project organized by the opera house. Recipients were randomly assigned to treatments designed to explore behavioral responses to linear matching schemes, as well as the mere existence of a substantial lead donor. We use the exogenous variation in match rates across treatments to estimate the price elasticities of charitable giving. We find that straight linear matching schemes raise the total donations received including the match value, but partially crowd out the actual donations given excluding the match. If charitable organizations can use lead gifts as they wish, our results show that they maximize donations given by simply announcing the presence of a lead gift. We contrast our price elasticity estimates with those based on changes in rules regarding tax deductions for charitable giving, as well as from the nascent literature using large-scale natural field experiments on giving.
Research Highlights
► We present evidence from a field experiment to understand the efficacy of fundraising schemes.
► The experiment was implemented in conjunction with the Bavarian State Opera House.
► We mailed 14,000 opera goers a letter describing a fundraising project organized by the opera house.
► The most effective fundraising scheme is to simply announce the presence of a substantial lead gift.
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 95, Issues 5–6, June 2011, Pages 351–362