کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
970317 | 931987 | 2007 | 16 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation Terrorist backlash, terrorism mitigation, and policy delegation](/preview/png/970317.png)
This paper presents a three-stage proactive game involving terrorists, elected policymakers, and voters. In each of two targeted countries, a representative voter chooses an elected policymaker, charged with deciding proactive countermeasures to ameliorate a transnational terrorist threat. Two primary considerations drive the voters' strategic choice: free riding on the other countries' countermeasures and limiting a reprisal terrorist attack. The resulting low proactive countermeasures benefit the terrorists, whose attacks successfully exploit voters' strategic actions. This finding stems from a delegation problem where leadership by voters has a detrimental consequence on the well-being of targeted countries. Domestic politics add another layer of concern when addressing a common terrorist threat.
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 91, Issue 9, September 2007, Pages 1800–1815