کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
970361 | 1479496 | 2006 | 35 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Redistribution and affirmative action Redistribution and affirmative action](/preview/png/970361.png)
The paper develops an integrated political economy model in which individuals are distinguished by earning ability and an ascriptive characteristic, race. The policy space is a transfer payment to low-income workers financed by a flat tax on wages and an affirmative action constraint on firms' hiring decisions. The distribution of income and the policy are endogenous, with the latter being the outcome of a legislative bargaining game between three legislative blocs. The model provides support for the common claim that racial divisions reduce support for welfare expenditures, even when voters have color-blind preferences. We show that relatively advantaged members of both the majority and minority group benefit from the introduction of a second dimension of redistribution, while the less advantaged members of the majority are the principal losers.
Journal: Journal of Public Economics - Volume 90, Issues 10–11, November 2006, Pages 1789–1823