کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
982303 | 1480468 | 2009 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
What happens to CEO compensation following turnover and succession?
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
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چکیده انگلیسی
When boards hire CEOs, the board and successor CEO have an opportunity to redesign the predecessor's compensation contract. The CEO's relative bargaining power will influence the outcome of compensation negotiations. Analyzing 508 successions, we find that total compensation of successor CEOs increases by 69% over their predecessor, but the structure of successor compensation is heavily influenced by the predecessors’ contracts. When the board's bargaining power is large, successors have a greater proportion of pay-at-risk and smaller proportion of salary. When the CEO's bargaining power is large, there is a smaller proportion of pay-at-risk and relatively greater proportion of salary.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance - Volume 49, Issue 2, May 2009, Pages 424–447
Journal: The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance - Volume 49, Issue 2, May 2009, Pages 424–447
نویسندگان
Eahab Elsaid, Wallace N. Davidson III,