Mutual fund flows and window-dressing

• We model a sequential game between a fund manager and an investor.
• An equilibrium exists where the manager sometimes window-dresses and the investor sometimes withdraws funds.
• An equilibrium does not exist where the manager never window-dresses.
• We show that window-dressing is a rational behavior even when fund outflows may result.

We use a sequential game to analyze an agency problem in the mutual fund industry where a representative fund manager considers window-dressing his portfolio holdings for the purpose of attracting fund flows from a representative investor. The manager is motivated to window-dress to improve the investor's perception of managerial skill which may positively affect fund flows in the next period. However, the investor may suspect window-dressing and thus downgrade perceived managerial skill. The model supports a Bayesian Nash equilibrium where the manager window-dresses only when receiving a low return in the first period and the investor withdraws funds only when observing low returns in both periods. Consequently, we show that window-dressing is a rational behavior even when fund outflows may result.