کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
985464 934601 2012 19 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Prices vs. Quantities with fiscal cushioning
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی انرژی انرژی (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Prices vs. Quantities with fiscal cushioning
چکیده انگلیسی

Enforcement of international environmental quantity regulations (e.g. tradable pollution permits) is often expected to be stricter than that of price regulations (e.g. emission taxes). While both instruments provide opportunities for misrepresenting actual pollution, enforcement of international price-based instruments is additionally hampered by potential fiscal cushioning, i.e. an adjustment of domestic fiscal policies offsetting the tax incentive to reduce emission reductions. The present paper extends the formal debate on Prices vs. Quantities by including the risk of fiscal cushioning. We find the level of the marginal benefit curve and the variance of costs become key elements for instrument choice and can render quantity regulations strictly preferable. Remarkably, in the latter case, the slopes of the marginal curves do not affect optimal instrument choice. Numerical calculations, using data taken from the international climate policy context, support the potential dominance of quantity regulations found in our formal analysis.


► We model Prices vs. Quantities with fiscal cushioning.
► In contrast to the literature we find the variance of costs affects instrument choice.
► The level of marginal benefits can render quantity controls strictly preferable.
► In this case, the slopes of the marginal curves are irrelevant for policy choice.
► Numerical calculations in the context of climate policy support our findings.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Resource and Energy Economics - Volume 34, Issue 2, May 2012, Pages 169–187
نویسندگان
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