کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
985842 | 934688 | 2010 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Investment and emission control under technology and pollution externalities Investment and emission control under technology and pollution externalities](/preview/png/985842.png)
This paper studies incentives to develop advanced pollution abatement technology when technology may spillover across agents and pollution abatement is a public good. We are motivated by a variety of pollution control issues where solutions require the development and implementation of new pollution abatement technologies. We show that at the Nash equilibrium of a simultaneous-move game with R&D investment and emission abatement, whether the free rider effect prevails and under-investment and excess emissions occur depends on the degree of technology spillovers and the effect of R&D on the marginal abatement costs. There are cases in which, contrary to conventional wisdom, Nash equilibrium investments in emissions reductions exceed the first-best case.
Journal: Resource and Energy Economics - Volume 32, Issue 1, January 2010, Pages 1–14