Expectational bottlenecks and the emerging of new organizational forms

In this article we discuss the dynamics of organizational change when agents have heterogeneous initial conjectures and do learn. In this framework, conjectural equilibrium is defined as a steady state of the learning process, and all the adjustment occurs in disequilibrium. We discuss the properties of the system under different “rationality” assumptions, and using well-known learning algorithms. We prove analytically that multiplicity of equilibria, and failure of good organizational routines, cannot be ruled out: better, they are fairly probable. Stability is a crucial matter: it is shown to depend on initial conjectures. Finally, learning does not necessarily select the best.

► We discuss the dynamics of organizational change in a conjectural equilibrium framework.
► We assume that agents have heterogeneous initial conjectures and learn.
► We prove analytically that multiplicity of equilibria, and failure of good organizational routines, cannot be ruled out.
► Discussing stability, we prove that learning does not necessarily select the best.