کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
998429 | 936657 | 2010 | 13 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی
اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و مالیه (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
We analyze the competitive effects of government bail-out policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that bail-outs lead to higher risk-taking among the protected bank’s competitors, independently of transparency. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, which intensifies competition in the deposit market, depresses other banks’ margins, and thereby increases risk-taking incentives. Contrary to conventional wisdom, protected banks may take lower risks when transparency in the banking sector is low and the deposit supply is sufficiently elastic.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Stability - Volume 6, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 156–168
Journal: Journal of Financial Stability - Volume 6, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 156–168
نویسندگان
Hendrik Hakenes, Isabel Schnabel,