کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
999290 936802 2007 26 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Evergreening in banking
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و مالیه (عمومی)
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Evergreening in banking
چکیده انگلیسی

In the dynamic model of banking, a bank's option to hide its loan losses by rolling over non-performing loans is shown to worsen moral hazard. Contrary to the classic theory, moral hazard may arise even when a bank cannot seek a correlated risk for its loans. The loans seem to be performing and the bank makes a profit although it is de facto insolvent. When the bank's balance sheet includes hidden non-performing loans, the bank may optimally shrink lending or gamble for resurrection by growing aggressively. To eliminate this type of moral hazard, which is broadly consistent with evidence from emerging economies, a few regulatory implications are suggested.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Stability - Volume 3, Issue 4, December 2007, Pages 368–393
نویسندگان
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