Keywords: پذیرش معوق; Air traffic management; Collaborative decision making; Deferred acceptance; Game theory; Top trading cycles;
مقالات ISI پذیرش معوق (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; AP backhaul resource aggregation; Deferred Acceptance; Matching game;
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; C78; D47; D61; Two-sided matching; Market design; Matching with contracts; Matching with constraints; Discrete convex analysis; Deferred acceptance;
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; C78; D47; D82; Type-specific minimum quotas; Stability; Priority rankings; Deferred acceptance; Controlled school choice;
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; D85; C91; C92; Decentralized matching; Deferred acceptance; Information; Loyalty;
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; C78; C91; C92; D78; I20; Affirmative action; Minority reserves; School choice; Deferred acceptance; Top trading cycles;
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; C72; C78; I21; School choice; Deferred acceptance; Decentralized matching;
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; Two-sided matching; Many-to-one-matching; Market design; Matching with contracts; Matching with constraints; Strategyproofness; Deferred acceptance;
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; Collaborative Decision Making; Intelligent system; Ground delay program; Deferred Acceptance; Game Theory
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; C78; D47; Matching; Deferred acceptance; Truncation; Market design; Manipulation;
NoteEquilibria under deferred acceptance: Dropping strategies, filled positions, and welfare
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; C78; D60; Many-to-one matching; Deferred acceptance; Nash equilibrium; Dropping strategies; Filled positions; Welfare;
School choice: Impossibilities for affirmative action
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; C70; D61; Matching; Stability; School choice; Affirmative action; Deferred acceptance; Top trading cycles;
Comparing school choice mechanisms by interim and ex-ante welfare
Keywords: پذیرش معوق; C78; D61; D63; I20; Boston mechanism; Gale-Shapley; Deferred acceptance; Ex-ante welfare; Strategyproof; School choice;