کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1000438 | 936994 | 2006 | 4 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Investment incentives and airport regulation Investment incentives and airport regulation](/preview/png/1000438.png)
Arguments for and against the proposition that price-capped privatised utilities have an incentive to under-invest are examined in the context of airport regulation. The general proposition finds support from generic arguments associated with the hold-up problem and with ex-post opportunism. Three counter arguments are then considered: that under-investment imposes additional internal costs on the firm; that the regulated firm can consume its monopoly rent by expanding its asset base; and that it can leverage its market power through seeking excessive investment. Consideration is then given to the empirical evidence focusing on price-capped airports in the UK and Ireland. It is concluded that, on balance, it is probable that the regulated airport companies have inclined towards over-investment.
Journal: Utilities Policy - Volume 14, Issue 4, December 2006, Pages 262–265