کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1004085 | 937736 | 2011 | 17 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The role of board independence in mitigating agency problem II in Australian family firms
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
We investigate the impact of board independence on earnings management on a sample of family controlled firms listed on the Australian Securities Exchange (ASX). Using panel data over the period 2000–2004, we find evidence of earnings management among family controlled firms in Australia, an environment of high investor protection and private benefits of control. Findings show that a higher proportion of independent directors on boards is effective in reducing earnings management, thereby mitigating agency problems associated with entrenchment and expropriation in family firms. We also find that managers of family firms are less aggressive in managing earnings via discretionary long-term accruals compared to non-family firms.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: The British Accounting Review - Volume 43, Issue 3, September 2011, Pages 230–246
Journal: The British Accounting Review - Volume 43, Issue 3, September 2011, Pages 230–246
نویسندگان
Lukas Setia-Atmaja, Janto Haman, George Tanewski,