کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1008735 | 938591 | 2011 | 9 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |

Determining that the centralized political system is the cause of its persistent economic problems, Japan’s political leaders have been promoting neoliberalism-oriented state decentralization since the early 2000s. Stimulated by this policy, the prefecture of Osaka – the center of Japan’s second economic region – and its neighbors established a federation-type regional government in December 2010. However, some members left this regionalist coalition before its launch, which demonstrates the existance of internal tensions. In this study, the frameworks of Institutional Collective Action and politics of scale are applied to examine the regionalism decision-making process. Our findings suggest: (1) systemic political and economic biases run within the regionalism and (2) the likely urban economic and governance conditions after the devolution would be much more uncertain and messier than the reform advocates suggest they would be.
► Our case study of the Japanese new regionalism shows within-region disparities.
► Economic goals override the political autonomy of local member communities.
► There are disadvantages to local governments with large rural areas.
► Spatial disparity invites competing new and varied scalar politics.
► New regionalism can cause scalar political uncertainty.
Journal: Cities - Volume 28, Issue 4, August 2011, Pages 281–289