کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1019430 | 940656 | 2011 | 14 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Persistence and heterogeneity in entrepreneurship: An evolutionary game theoretic analysis
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
کسب و کار و مدیریت بین المللی
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چکیده انگلیسی
Studies show that countries exhibit a relatively stable level of entrepreneurial activity. To account for this fact, we adopt an evolutionary game theoretic approach. Based upon the analysis of games that capture essential features of the entrepreneurial phenomenon, we ascertain conditions under which evolutionary stable equilibria will be played by a population consisting of agents who engage in entrepreneurship and agents who do not. We show that entrepreneurship may persist even without assuming strategic complementarities or group selection. Lastly, we explain how information about equilibrium payoffs to self- and paid employment could help address the question of whether entrepreneurs differ from other economic agents.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Business Venturing - Volume 26, Issue 4, July 2011, Pages 458–471
Journal: Journal of Business Venturing - Volume 26, Issue 4, July 2011, Pages 458–471
نویسندگان
Graciela Kuechle,