Tradable credit scheme for mobility management considering travelers’ loss aversion

• Tradable credit schemes considering travelers’ loss aversion are proposed.
• The transaction costs are incorporated in the travel disutility function.
• The UE conditions are formulated into an equivalent variational inequality problem.
• The SO credit scheme doesn’t always exist considering users’ loss aversion.
• A mathematical program is used to obtain an optimal credit scheme

Under a given tradable credit scheme, travelers’ loss aversion behavior for credit charging during the route choice process is studied. A disutility function of loss aversion is applied to approach travelers’ different attitudes towards credit loss and gain, and the transaction costs of buying and selling credits are also incorporated in the function. The user equilibrium (UE) and market equilibrium (ME) conditions considering loss aversion effects are formulated into a variational inequality (VI) problem. Analyses demonstrate that the system optimum (SO) credit scheme does not always exist. A proposition is further presented to guarantee its existence.