National Security Directive declassification

The secret character of National Security Directives (NSDs) impairs Congress's ability to pursue its constitutionally mandated policy making and oversight roles when the president employs these directives to unilaterally make national security policy. In addition, their typically classified status presents numerous problems for scholars who can monitor the president's unilateral actions when he employs executive orders, proclamations, or executive agreements, but cannot do so in the case of policy created by security classified NSDs. Many of these directives remain classified for significant periods, as the results presented in this article will show. Furthermore, classification and declassification policy is unilaterally set by the president and, therefore, may be arbitrarily altered to lengthen the time it takes for NSDs to become available for congressional and public scrutiny. The article concludes that a statutory basis could provide more government openness and enhance Congress's ability to provide effective oversight of national security policy made through NSDs.