کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10368031 873912 2005 17 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه مهندسی کامپیوتر سیستم های اطلاعاتی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Approximately-strategyproof and tractable multiunit auctions
چکیده انگلیسی
We present an approximately-efficient and approximately-strategyproof auction mechanism for a single-good multiunit allocation problem. The bidding language allows marginal-decreasing piecewise-constant curves and quantity-based side constraints. We develop a fully polynomial-time approximation scheme for the multiunit allocation problem, which computes a (1+ε) approximation in worst-case time T=O(n3/ε), given n bids each with a constant number of pieces. We integrate this approximation scheme within a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism and compute payments for an asymptotic cost of O(T log n). The maximal possible gain from manipulation to a bidder in the combined scheme is bounded by εV/(1+ε), where V is the total surplus in the efficient outcome.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Decision Support Systems - Volume 39, Issue 1, March 2005, Pages 105-121
نویسندگان
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