کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10458609 | 922267 | 2012 | 7 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The irrelevance of folk intuitions to the “hard problem” of consciousness
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری
علم عصب شناسی
علوم اعصاب شناختی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
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چکیده انگلیسی
Recently, a number of philosophers have turned to folk intuitions about mental states for data about qualia and phenomenal consciousness. In this paper I argue that current research along these lines does not tell us about these subjects. I focus on a series of studies, performed by Justin Sytsma and Edouard Machery, to make my argument. Folk judgments studied by these researchers are mostly likely generated by a certain cognitive system - System One - that will generate the same data whether or not we experience phenomenal consciousness. This is a problem for a range of current experimental philosophy research into consciousness or our concept of it. If experimental philosophy is to shed light into phenomenal consciousness, it needs to be better founded in an understanding of how we make judgments.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Consciousness and Cognition - Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2012, Pages 644-650
Journal: Consciousness and Cognition - Volume 21, Issue 2, June 2012, Pages 644-650
نویسندگان
Brian Talbot,