کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10458674 922269 2010 11 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Descartes discarded? Introspective self-awareness and the problems of transparency and compositionality
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم زیستی و بیوفناوری علم عصب شناسی علوم اعصاب شناختی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Descartes discarded? Introspective self-awareness and the problems of transparency and compositionality
چکیده انگلیسی
What has the self to be like such that introspective awareness of it is possible? The paper asks if Descartes's idea of an inner self can be upheld and discusses this issue by invoking two principles: the phenomenal transparency of experience and the semantic compositionality of conceptual content. It is assumed that self-awareness is a second-order state either in the domain of experience or in the domain of thought. In the former case self-awareness turns out empty if experience is transparent. In the latter, it can best be conceived of as a form of mental quotation. Various proposed analyses of direct and indirect quotation are discussed and tested regarding their applicability to thought. It is concluded that, on the assumption of compositionality, the inner self is only insofar accessible to awareness as it has an accessible phonological (or otherwise subsymbolic) structure, as apparently only inner speech does.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Consciousness and Cognition - Volume 19, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 751-761
نویسندگان
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