Punitive sentiment among the Shuar and in industrialized societies: cross-cultural similarities

Cross-cultural diversity in economic game behavior has been cited as evidence that humans do not possess psychological adaptations specialized for cooperation in collective actions (CAs). In this paper, it is argued that such adaptations may, in fact, exist and that their design may be illuminated by the appropriate kinds of cross-cultural data. To exemplify an aspect of cooperation that may not vary cross culturally, data are provided suggesting that, in the CAs of Shuar hunter-horticulturists, punitive sentiment towards free riders takes a form similar to that which it takes in industrialized societies: It is experienced mainly by high contributors and directed mainly at CA beneficiaries who could have contributed highly but chose not to. If anti-free-rider punitive sentiment is essentially similar cross culturally, then it may be the product of a species-typical psychological mechanism specialized for such sentiment. How such a mechanism may have evolved is discussed.