کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10475409 929139 2005 21 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Stochastic bycatch, informational asymmetry, and discarding
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی اقتصاد، اقتصادسنجی و امور مالی اقتصاد و اقتصادسنجی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Stochastic bycatch, informational asymmetry, and discarding
چکیده انگلیسی
The existing literature (i) examines bycatch and discard behavior in a static framework and (ii) treats bycatch as a deterministic process uniform across vessels. Using a dynamic representative agent model in a two-stock resource, this paper explores strategic interactions between a social planner and two groups of harvesters, one of which imposes a stochastic “technological externality” (bycatch) on the other. In addition to limitations on entry and the number of trips taken in each industry, three bycatch control instruments are compared to the unconstrained case: taxes, trip limits, and value-based quotas. Implementation and enforcement costs aside, taxes dominate both types of quota, and value limits outperform trip limits by eliminating one type of discarding. In simulations, relative performance depends upon variance in the bycatch process, differences in the ex vessel prices of stocks, relative efficiency of the harvester types, and fixed costs on the trip and industry margins.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management - Volume 49, Issue 3, May 2005, Pages 463-483
نویسندگان
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