کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10475834 929418 2005 26 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Optimal toeholds in takeover contests
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Optimal toeholds in takeover contests
چکیده انگلیسی
We offer an explanation for why raiders do not acquire the maximum possible toehold prior to announcing a takeover bid. By endogenously modeling the target firm's value following an unsuccessful takeover we demonstrate that a raider may optimally acquire a small toehold even if the acquisition does not drive up the pre-tender target price. This occurs because although a larger toehold increases profits if the takeover succeeds it also conveys a higher level of managerial entrenchment and hence a lower firm value if the takeover fails. We derive new predictions regarding the optimal toehold and target value following a failed takeover. We also examine the impact of a rival bidder and dilution.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 77, Issue 2, August 2005, Pages 321-346
نویسندگان
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