کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10475917 | 929443 | 2012 | 23 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies Seeking safety: The relation between CEO inside debt holdings and the riskiness of firm investment and financial policies](/preview/png/10475917.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm. Because these characteristics of inside debt expose the CEO to default risk similar to that faced by outside creditors, theory predicts that CEOs with large inside debt holdings will display lower levels of risk-seeking behavior (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Consistent with the theoretical predictions, we find a negative association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns, R&D expenditures, and financial leverage, and a positive association between CEO inside debt holdings and the extent of diversification and asset liquidity. Collectively, our results provide empirical evidence suggesting that CEOs with large inside debt holdings prefer investment and financial policies that are less risky.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 103, Issue 3, March 2012, Pages 588-610
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 103, Issue 3, March 2012, Pages 588-610
نویسندگان
Cory A. Cassell, Shawn X. Huang, Juan Manuel Sanchez, Michael D. Stuart,