کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10475926 | 929444 | 2005 | 44 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
How much value can blockholders tunnel? Evidence from the Bulgarian mass privatization auctions
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
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چکیده انگلیسی
This study examines the emergence of the Bulgarian stock market and the role of controlling blockholders. A new approach using mass privatization auction data measures the premium for control and demonstrates that, in the absence of legal constraints, majority owners extract more than 85% of firm value as private benefits of control. Institutional investors form portfolios of predominantly controlling positions or participate in majority coalitions. Ownership stakes cluster at 51%. After the privatized companies begin trading on the Bulgarian Stock Exchange, majority-owned firms trade at 40-60% discounts. Overall, the results support the Fama and Jensen (J. law Ecorg 26 (1983) 301) view that majority-owned firms cannot persist as publicly traded corporations if the expropriating activities of controlling blockholders are not legally restricted.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 76, Issue 1, April 2005, Pages 191-234
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 76, Issue 1, April 2005, Pages 191-234
نویسندگان
Vladimir Atanasov,