کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10475959 | 929455 | 2005 | 41 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Investment timing, agency, and information
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Investment timing, agency, and information Investment timing, agency, and information](/preview/png/10475959.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
This paper provides a model of investment timing by managers in a decentralized firm in the presence of agency conflicts and information asymmetries. When investment decisions are delegated to managers, contracts must be designed to provide incentives for managers to both extend effort and truthfully reveal private information. Using a real options approach, we show that an underlying option to invest can be decomposed into two components: a manager's option and an owner's option. The implied investment behavior differs significantly from that of the first-best no-agency solution. In particular, greater inertia occurs in investment, as the model predicts that the manager will have a more valuable option to wait than the owner.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 75, Issue 3, March 2005, Pages 493-533
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 75, Issue 3, March 2005, Pages 493-533
نویسندگان
Steven R. Grenadier, Neng Wang,