کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10476067 | 929516 | 2005 | 24 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions: The effects of agency conflicts
دانلود مقاله + سفارش ترجمه
دانلود مقاله ISI انگلیسی
رایگان برای ایرانیان
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
مدیریت، کسب و کار و حسابداری
حسابداری
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions: The effects of agency conflicts Interactions of corporate financing and investment decisions: The effects of agency conflicts](/preview/png/10476067.png)
چکیده انگلیسی
We examine interactions between flexible financing and investment decisions in a model with stockholder-bondholder conflicts over investment policy. We find that financial flexibility encourages the choice of short-term debt thereby dramatically reducing the agency costs of under- and overinvestment. However, the reduction in agency costs may not encourage the firm to increase leverage, since the firm's initial debt level choice depends on the type of growth options in its investment opportunity set. The model has a number of testable predictions for the joint choice of leverage and maturity, and how these choices interact with a firm's growth opportunities.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 76, Issue 3, June 2005, Pages 667-690
Journal: Journal of Financial Economics - Volume 76, Issue 3, June 2005, Pages 667-690
نویسندگان
Paul D. Childs, David C. Mauer, Steven H. Ott,