کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
10480524 932829 2005 12 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
Efficiency in uncertain cooperative games
چکیده انگلیسی
A contingent contract in a transferable utility game under uncertainty specifies an outcome for each possible state. It is assumed that coalitions evaluate these contracts by considering the minimal possible excesses. A main question of the paper concerns the existence and characterization of efficient contracts. It is shown that they exist if and only if the set of possible coalitions contains a balanced subset. Moreover, a characterization of values that result in efficient contracts in the case of minimally balanced collections is provided.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 50, Issue 1, July 2005, Pages 12-23
نویسندگان
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