کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
10480525 | 932829 | 2005 | 15 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Stable coalitions in a continuous-time model of risk sharing
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه
ریاضیات
ریاضیات کاربردی
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
چکیده انگلیسی
In an economy with a continuum of individuals, each individual has a stochastic, continuously evolving endowment process. Individuals are risk-averse and would therefore like to insure their endowment processes. It is feasible to obtain insurance by pooling endowments across individuals because the processes are mutually independent. We characterize the payoff from an insurance contracting scheme of this type, and we investigate whether such a scheme would survive as an equilibrium in a noncooperative setting. We focus on the stability of cooperative arrangements with respect to the dynamic formation of coalitions. The economy “crystallizes” into a collection of coalitions in equilibrium.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 50, Issue 1, July 2005, Pages 24-38
Journal: Mathematical Social Sciences - Volume 50, Issue 1, July 2005, Pages 24-38
نویسندگان
H. Chade, B. Taub,