Incentivising operational performance on the UK rail infrastructure since 1996

This paper describes the various measures that were introduced to incentivise Railtrack (the owner and operator of rail infrastructure in the UK)2 to improve the performance of the UK railway infrastructure (in terms of delays and cancellations to trains). The paper traces the development of the operational performance regimes between Railtrack and then Network Rail3 and the franchised passenger train operators (TOCs), as well as licence enforcement and other actions that were taken to try to encourage improvements in network performance. It sets out the changes that have occurred since the Hatfield accident in October 2000, and the obligations that have been placed on Network Rail since it took over ownership and management of the network. It suggests that while the performance regimes have sought to establish incentives to achieve an efficient level of network performance, in practice the framework has undergone a number of changes and in any case the infrastructure owner has had relatively limited direct control over the outcome (particularly in terms of delay experienced by the final customer). As a consequence, the results have been at best mixed. There is now a stable financial and incentive structure and much greater industry co-operation over performance initiatives, however the delivery of a stable, reliable rail network remains a considerable challenge for the industry over the next 10 years.