Manipulating electoral laws in Singapore

• Examines the mechanical and psychological effects of electoral reforms in Singapore.
• Party bloc vote system spiked disproportionality and lowered number of parties.
• Larger multi-member districts deterred electoral competition and increased uncontested seats.
• Voters prefer larger parties with credible candidates and clear policy alternatives.
• Manipulation disadvantaged smaller parties and boosted incumbent's legislative supermajority.

The literature on electoral authoritarianism has drawn attention to the use of democratic electoral institutions for undemocratic gains. This paper adds to this body of work by showing how a sophisticated hegemonic party in Singapore manipulated its majoritarian electoral system to “manufacture” its legislative supermajority. By measuring the psychological and mechanical effects of the altered electoral system in Singapore, it shows how changes in the rules of the game boosted the incumbent's legislative dominance despite its declining vote shares in the late 1980s. It also offers new evidence to show how electoral manipulation create an uneven playing field with institutional constraints that penalize smaller parties and benefit the ruling, larger party.