Office effects and campaign spending in a semi-open list PR system: The Belgian/Flemish federal and regional elections 1999–2010

In majoritarian systems, campaign spending is generally found to be more effective for challengers than for incumbents. This article seeks to understand how the personal campaign spending of a candidate impacts preference votes in a semi-open List PR system. We analyse the effect of office in general, postulating that the size of the effect varies with the prominence of the office. On the basis of the pooled data on six different elections in the Flemish region of Belgium, we show that personal spending has an effect on the number and the relative share of preference votes, except for ministers and (to a lesser extent) mayors of local communalities. Irrespective of the office, personal spending has no effect on the odds of actually obtaining a seat.

► Personal spending has an effect on the number and relative share of preference votes.
► The size of this spending effect varies according to the office held by the candidate.
► The effect disappears amongst incumbent ministers, and diminishes amongst mayors.
► Personal spending has no effect on the odds of actually obtaining a seat.