Migrants' remittances and economic voting in the Mexican countryside

• Analyzes new survey data collected in rural communities of Michoacán, Mexico.
• Develops a new way to measure migrants' remittances called the Remittances Index.
• Remittance recipients tend to have fewer economic grievances than average.
• Remittance recipients less likely to lobby government officials for economic aid.
• Remittance recipients less likely to vote or to vote for opposition party.

This study advances and tests hypotheses about the effects of migrants' remittances on political behavior. Analyzing new survey data from Mexico, I find that despite being very poor, respondents who receive remittances tend to view their income as more stable than neighbors who do not receive this money. As a result, remittance recipients have relatively fewer economic grievances and tend to feel more optimistic about economic matters than neighbors who do not receive remittances. According to the economic voter thesis, citizens who are more satisfied with the economy are also less likely to pressure and oppose politicians, particularly incumbents. Analyses indicate that respondents in this sample who receive remittances are indeed less likely to lobby local officials for economic assistance. They were also less likely to mobilize against and punish the incumbent party in the 2006 Mexican presidential election.