کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1051953 | 946366 | 2010 | 11 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
![عکس صفحه اول مقاله: Strategic coalition voting: Evidence from Austria Strategic coalition voting: Evidence from Austria](/preview/png/1051953.png)
Strategic coalition voting assumes that voters cast their vote in a way that maximizes the probability that a preferred coalition will be formed after the election. We identify three decision contexts that provide incentives for strategic coalition voting: (1) a rental vote of a major party supporter in favor of a preferred junior coalition partner perceived as uncertain to pass a minimum vote threshold, (2) avoiding a wasted vote for the preferred small party that is not expected to pass the minimum vote threshold, and (3) explicit strategic coalition voting to influence the composition and/or portfolio of the next coalition government. The results based on a nationally representative survey conducted before the 2006 Austrian general election generally support these hypotheses.
Journal: Electoral Studies - Volume 29, Issue 3, September 2010, Pages 339–349