Is the Democratic Party’s superdelegate system unfair to voters?

Among the reasons for the historic nature of the 2008 Democratic primary race was the attention paid to the “superdelegates”. The competitiveness of the primary and the important role the superdelegates played has led to calls for reform. This paper develops a formal model that explains why superdelegates selected one candidate over the other and why some superdelegates committed early in the primary season while others waited. Hypotheses are tested using an original dataset collected during the 2008 Democratic primary. The results suggest that although some superdelegates made their decision based on personal, idiosyncratic factors, for many superdelegates, Democratic voters played the most important role in their commitment process.

► Superdelegate commitment behavior in 2008 was not random or unpredictable, but followed a regular and predictable pattern.
► Most superdelegates were attempting to coordinate with their constituents when making their commitment decision.
► Those that waited did so because they were uncertain about who their voters preferred in the Democratic presidential primary race.
► The results have implications for elite behavior during the campaign.
► Even when superdelegates are important, voters are still the most important actors when selecting a presidential nominee.