کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1052390 | 946386 | 2006 | 19 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
Critical strategies under approval voting: Who gets ruled in and ruled out
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کلمات کلیدی
موضوعات مرتبط
علوم انسانی و اجتماعی
علوم اجتماعی
جغرافیا، برنامه ریزی و توسعه
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چکیده انگلیسی
We introduce the notion of a “critical strategy profile” under approval voting (AV), which facilitates the identification of all possible outcomes that can occur under AV. Included among AV outcomes are those given by scoring rules, single transferable vote, the majoritarian compromise, Condorcet systems, and others as well. Under each of these systems, a Condorcet winner may be upset through manipulation by individual voters or coalitions of voters, whereas AV ensures the election of a Condorcet winner as a strong Nash equilibrium wherein voters use sincere strategies. To be sure, AV may also elect Condorcet losers and other lesser candidates, sometimes in equilibrium. This multiplicity of (equilibrium) outcomes is the product of a social-choice framework that is more general than the standard preference-based one. From a normative perspective, we argue that voter judgments about candidate acceptability should take precedence over the usual social-choice criteria, such as electing a Condorcet or Borda winner.
ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Electoral Studies - Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2006, Pages 287-305
Journal: Electoral Studies - Volume 25, Issue 2, June 2006, Pages 287-305
نویسندگان
Steven J. Brams, M. Remzi Sanver,