کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1061236 | 947664 | 2007 | 7 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
This paper examines why market and government institutions failed to prevent over fishing in the Southern Gulf snow crab fishery, whereas non-market institutions succeeded. A general conclusion is that the institutional environment in which economic behaviour must be coordinated for successful fisheries management is complex. More specifically, collective action dilemmas arise from the interdependency of human and fish species interactions. However, successful institutions are capable of resolving these dilemmas when they achieve credible commitment. Coordination mechanisms such as co-management contracts, horizontal patterns of communication and win–win negotiations all contribute to building an institutional arrangement in which participants are motivated to comply with conservation objectives.
Journal: Marine Policy - Volume 31, Issue 3, May 2007, Pages 320–326