Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; Entry; Exit; Rent dissipation; Credible commitment; Timing games; War of attrition; C73; D92; L13;
مقالات ISI تعهد قابل اعتماد (ترجمه نشده)
مقالات زیر هنوز به فارسی ترجمه نشده اند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
در صورتی که به ترجمه آماده هر یک از مقالات زیر نیاز داشته باشید، می توانید سفارش دهید تا مترجمان با تجربه این مجموعه در اسرع وقت آن را برای شما ترجمه نمایند.
Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; Experiments; Ultimatum game; Multilateral bargaining; Credible commitment
Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; R21; R31; R38; Tenancy rent control; Rent control; Maintenance; Housing quality; Credible commitment;
Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; D02; D23; H41; K11; Property rights; Credible commitment; Independent judiciary; Constitutional Economics; Transmission channels;
Audited financial reporting and voluntary disclosure as complements: A test of the Confirmation Hypothesis
Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; M41; M42; Confirmatory role of financial reporting; Private information; Credible commitment; Voluntary disclosure; Management forecasts; Audit verification;
Investment without democracy: Ruling-party institutionalization and credible commitment in autocracies
Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; O17; P16; P26; Investment; Dictatorship; Ruling parties; Credible commitment;
Is the more able manager always safer from takeover?
Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; G30; G34; G33; Takeover; Managerial entrenchment; Credible commitment; Renegotiation-proof;
Electoral fraud, the rise of Peron and demise of checks and balances in Argentina
Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; Critical junctures; Property rights; Credible commitment; Beliefs; Rule of law; Supreme Court;
Patterns of fisheries institutional failure and success: Experience from the Southern Gulf of St. Lawrence snow crab fishery, in Nova Scotia, Canada
Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; Fisheries management institutions; Economic incentives; Co-management; Institutional failure; Credible commitment
From royal to parliamentary rule without revolution: The economics of constitutional exchange within divided governments
Keywords: تعهد قابل اعتماد; D7; D6; H1; N4; Constitutional exchange; Tax constitution; Divided government; Market for power; Public choice; Dictatorship; Democracy; Division of power; Credible commitment; Constitutional evolution; Veto players; King and council; Rise of parliament;