کد مقاله کد نشریه سال انتشار مقاله انگلیسی نسخه تمام متن
1129678 955299 2009 8 صفحه PDF دانلود رایگان
عنوان انگلیسی مقاله ISI
The stability of exchange networks
موضوعات مرتبط
مهندسی و علوم پایه ریاضیات آمار و احتمال
پیش نمایش صفحه اول مقاله
The stability of exchange networks
چکیده انگلیسی

Economic and sociological exchange theories predict divisions of exchange benefits given an assumed fixed network of exchange relations. Since network structure has been found to have a large impact on actors’ payoffs, actors have strong incentives for network change. We answer the question what happens to both the network structure and actor payoffs when myopic actors change their links in order to maximize their payoffs. We investigate the networks that are stable, the networks that are efficient or egalitarian with varying tie costs, and the occurrence of social dilemmas. Only few networks are stable over a wide range of tie costs, and all of them can be divided into two types: efficient networks consisting of only dyads and at most one isolate, and Pareto efficient and egalitarian cycles with an odd number of actors. Social dilemmas are observed in even-sized networks at low tie costs.

ناشر
Database: Elsevier - ScienceDirect (ساینس دایرکت)
Journal: Social Networks - Volume 31, Issue 2, May 2009, Pages 118–125
نویسندگان
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