کد مقاله | کد نشریه | سال انتشار | مقاله انگلیسی | نسخه تمام متن |
---|---|---|---|---|
1160236 | 1490333 | 2015 | 5 صفحه PDF | دانلود رایگان |
• Bruno Latour's practice-based model of science excludes a role for subjectivity.
• To correct this, I put a spin on Latour's diagrammatic representation of his theory.
• The practices and subjectivities of science are thus reunited.
Bruno Latour claims to have shown that a Kantian model of knowledge, which he describes as seeking to unite a disembodied transcendental subject with an inaccessible thing-in-itself, is dramatically falsified by empirical studies of science in action. Instead, Latour puts central emphasis on scientific practice, and replaces this Kantian model with a model of “circulating reference.” Unfortunately, Latour's alternative schematic leaves out the scientific subject. I repair this oversight through a simple mechanical procedure. By putting a slight spin on Latour's diagrammatic representation of his theory, I discover a new space for a post-Kantian scientific subject, a subject brilliantly described by Ludwik Fleck. The neglected subjectivities and ceaseless practices of science are thus re-united.
Journal: Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A - Volume 49, February 2015, Pages 103–107