State of the field: Transient underdetermination and values in science

This paper examines the state of the field of “science and values”—particularly regarding the implications of the thesis of transient underdetermination for the ideal of value-free science, or what I call the “ideal of epistemic purity.” I do this by discussing some of the main arguments in the literature, both for and against the ideal. I examine a preliminary argument from transient underdetermination against the ideal of epistemic purity, and I discuss two different formulations of an objection to this argument—an objection that requires the strict separation of the epistemic from the practical. A secondary aim of the paper is to suggest some future directions for the field, one of which is to replace the vocabulary of values that is often employed in the literature with a more precise one.

► This paper examines the implications of the thesis of transient underdetermination.
► I argue that the thesis underdetermines the ideal of epistemic purity.
► I defend this argument from an objection originally due to Richard Jeffrey.
► Finally, I argue that the vocabulary used in the “science and values” debate is problematic.