‘Holding’ and ‘endorsing’ claims in the course of scientific activities

• ‘Holding’, ‘adopting’ and ‘endorsing’ are distinct cognitive attitudes, pertinent at different stages of scientific practice.
• None of these cognitive attitudes is reducible to ‘accepting’ (as defined by Jonathan Cohen).
• Aspects of the controversies about GMOs serve to illustrate the differences between ‘holding’ and ‘accepting’.
• Implications are drawn for democratic policy-making about science and technology and for the responsibilities of scientists.

My principal aims are to show that holding, adopting and endorsing (definitions of which I provide) are distinct cognitive attitudes that may be taken towards claims at different moments of scientific activities, and that none of them are reducible to acceptance (as defined by Jonathan Cohen); to explore in detail the differences between holding and accepting, using the controversies about GMOs to provide illustrations; and to draw some implications pertinent to democratic decision-making concerning public policies about science and technology, and to the responsibilities that scientists thereby incur.