Subjectivity and emotion in scientific research

• A naturalistic and externalist method accommodates an epistemic role for emotions.
• Epistemic emotions determine salience in acts of scientific attention.
• Epistemic emotions are refined and calibrated through intersubjective processes.
• These processes may be reconstructed through sociological and historical analysis.
• Such reconstructions help to demystify the role of emotion in scientific research.

A persistent puzzle for philosophers of science is the well-documented appeal made by scientists to their aesthetic emotions in the course of scientific research. Emotions are usually viewed as irremediably subjective, and thus of no epistemological interest. Yet, by denying an epistemic role for scientists’ emotional dispositions, philosophers find themselves in the awkward position of ignoring phenomena which scientists themselves often insist are of importance. This paper suggests a possible solution to this puzzle by challenging the wholesale identification of emotion with subjectivity. The proposed method is a naturalistic and externalist one, calling for empirical investigation into the intersubjective processes by which scientists’ emotional dispositions become refined and attuned to specific objects of attention. The proposal is developed through a critical discussion of Michael Polanyi’s theory of scientific passions, as well as plant geneticist Barbara McClintock’s celebrated “feeling for the organism.”